Should Congress place additional limits on a president's ability to issue pardons?

Background

The presidential pardon power is one of the broadest authorities granted by the U.S. Constitution. Article II, Section 2 gives the president the power to grant reprieves and pardons for federal offenses, with only two explicit limits: pardons apply only to federal crimes, and they cannot be used in cases of impeachment. The Supreme Court has historically reinforced this breadth, holding in Ex parte Garland that the power is not subject to legislative control, and reaffirming as recently as 2024 that pardons are among the president's exclusive powers from which Congress is barred from acting. The debate over whether to add new checks has intensified in recent years. In January 2025, President Trump issued blanket clemency to nearly 1,600 individuals connected to the January 6 Capitol attack, and President Biden drew criticism for pardoning his son Hunter before leaving office. These actions, spanning both parties, have spurred multiple reform proposals in Congress. In the 119th Congress, at least two proposed constitutional amendments would limit presidential pardons, including the Pardon Integrity Act led by Representative Johnny Olszewski, which gained its first Republican cosponsor, Representative Don Bacon, in February 2026.

Supporters of new limits argue that the pardon power, while rooted in mercy, has been increasingly used for self-dealing and political favoritism across administrations of both parties. The Brennan Center for Justice has noted that pardons were originally meant to address injustices, but the breadth of the power has made it susceptible to misuse. Proposed reforms range from constitutional amendments banning self-pardons and pardons of family members and close associates, to creating a process allowing Congress to nullify a pardon with a two-thirds supermajority vote in both chambers. Opponents of new restrictions counter that the Framers deliberately gave the president unfettered pardon authority. Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 74 that mercy should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed, and that a single executive would be more reliable in dispensing clemency than a legislative body that might be swayed by passion. Legal scholars in this camp warn that adding congressional checks could politicize individual pardons, slow urgent acts of clemency during crises, and upset the constitutional separation of powers.

What is at stake goes beyond any single president's actions. The pardon power affects crime victims who may see restitution and fines cancelled, defendants who may deserve mercy after unjust sentences, and public trust in the rule of law itself. Because the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress cannot limit pardons through ordinary legislation, most substantive reforms would require a constitutional amendment, a process demanding two-thirds approval in both chambers of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of state legislatures. Several states already use clemency boards or require legislative approval for gubernatorial pardons, offering potential models. Whether the federal system should follow suit is ultimately a question about how Americans balance executive mercy with democratic accountability.